Presents a defence of the existence of libertarian freedom of will, arguing that choices are essentially uncaused events with teleological explanations. This work presents scholarly monographs offering the research and debate to students and scholars in philosophy of religion.
In “Freedom, Teleology, and Evil” Stewart Goetz
defends the existence of libertarian freedom of the will. He argues that choices are essentially uncaused events with teleological explanations in the form of reasons or purposes. Because choices are uncaused events with teleological explanations, whenever agents choose they are free to choose otherwise. Given this freedom to choose otherwise, agents are morally responsible for how they choose. Thus, Goetz advocates and defends the principle of alternative possibilities which states that agents are morally responsible for a choice only if they are free to choose otherwise. Finally, given that agents have libertarian freedom, Goetz contends that this freedom is integral to the construction of a theodicy which explains why God allows evil.“Continuum Studies in the Philosophy of Religion” presents scholarly monographs offering cutting-edge research and debate to students and scholars in philosophy of religion.
The series engages with the central questions and issues within the field, including the problem of evil, the cosmological, teleological, moral, and ontological arguments for the existence of God, divine foreknowledge, and the coherence of theism. It also incorporates volumes on the following metaphysical issues as and when they directly impact on the philosophy of religion: the existence and nature of the soul, the existence and nature of free will, natural law, the meaning of life, and science and religion.
'Goetz's remarkable book “Freedom, Teleology, and Evil” fills a much-needed gap in the contemporary discussion of the metaphysics of human freedom. For many years, philosophers have noted the existence of logical space for a thoroughly noncausal libertarian theory, but generally dismissed the idea as unworthy of serious or sustained discussion. Such disdain will be hard to defend in the wake of Goetz's careful and detailed defense of one version of this view. His position is presented with great clarity and precision, and difficulties alleged to bedevil the theory are met head-on. The extension of the view into theological issues in the final chapter is also much to be applauded. Many libertarians (including this one) may still have reservations regarding the noncausal approach even after reading this impressive book, but few will (or at least should) still doubt that it is an option worthy of libertarians' most serious consideration.' -Thomas Flint, Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame
(M. Litt., Oxford; Ph.D., Notre Dame) is Chair and Professor of Philosophy at Ursinus College, Collegeville, PA. Previously he was a NEH Summer Fellow at Stanford University. His major areas of research are action theory, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion. He has journal articles published in American Philosophical Quarterly, Faith and Philosophy, International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Mind, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophia Christi, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and Religious Studies. He has published or has forthcoming papers in books published by Blackwell, Cornell University Press, Oxford University Press, and Routledge and is co-author with Charles Taliaferro of Naturalism, forthcoming in 2008 with Eerdmans. At present, he serves on the board of directors for Blackwell's Philosophy Compass.